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BOOK REVIEWS
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS. By James W.
Hurst.* Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950. Pp. xiii, 502. $5.50.
Any historical work of significance is a compound of objective reporting
and subjective interpretation. Even the historian who sets for himself the
goal of surveying the past sine ira et studio with the utmost detachment and
scientific exactitude is likely to fall short of his austere and commendable
objective. The very process of selecting, from the inexhaustible storehouse
of the past, the facts worthy of historical treatment and analysis involves
a determination of what is important and what is immaterial. This determi-
nation is, to some extent at least, dependent upon the author's own sense of
values and the intellectual and moral orientation of his time. Events that ap-
pear highly significant to him may have meant little to the contemporaries of
the event, and the generalizations drawn by him will frequently be colored by
his basic philosophical assumptions and social beliefs. Also, the chain of causa-
tion responsible for a historical happening is often so complex that the web
produced by innumerable causal threads becomes too intricate to be unravelled.
On the other hand, unless the historian yields to the temptation to mistake the
complexity of the historical process for mere accidentalism, he must trace
causes and discern connections between events. His special knowledge,
background, and experience will almost invariably lead him to attribute
particular weight to those factors which are most accessible to his perception.
These considerations indicate that the attempt of the conscientious his-
torian to reconstruct the past "as it really was" is beset with almost insuperable
difficulties; but they are not meant to suggest that the pursuit of maximum
objectivity in historical reporting is a false or futile goal. Some great
historians have succeeded in minimizing the element of "subjective interfer-
ence" of the observer and, lifting themselves above their individual prefer-
ences and the prejudices of their time, have attempted to describe and analyze
a historical epoch in the light of its own basic beliefs and peculiar scale of
values. Other historical works-often highly influential ones-have been,
on the other hand, primarily vehicles of political or religious propaganda
designed to prove dictatorially the truth of certain pre-conceived axioms and
theses.
Professor Hurst's work, like most significant historical treatises, com-
bines factual reporting with personal interpretation, and the relative propor-
tion of these elements in his treatment is sound and balanced. A large part
of the book is devoted to the collection of historical information on subjects
as diverse as the working characteristics of legislatures, the influence of
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin School of Law.
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lobbies, attitudes of courts toward legislation, use of the power of judicial
review, objectives of legal education, standards of admission to the bar, size
of law firms, class background of lawyers, and trends in administrative regu-
lation. His chapter on the American bar, which is replete with historical and
sociological information on the place of the legal profession in the political and
social structure of the United States, is particularly instructive.
On the interpretative side, Professor Hurst has undertaken to analyze,
among other subjects, the social functions of legislatures, the contributions of
judges to law-making, the working philosophy of lawyers, and the comparative
influence of the various law-making agencies. His viewpoint, Professor Hurst
points out in his prefatory note, is "primarily that of a professional interest
in law as an instrument of social values," and he has tried to "select for dis-
cussion lines of growth which have meaning for the middle of the twentieth
century." From his avowed emphasis on law "as an instrument of social
values" follows, with logical consistency, his criticism or disapproval of
certain facets of American legal growth. He believes that, by and large,
legislatures failed in their social functions.' He points out that the ethical
standards of legislators have generally been low.2 The undertone in his dis-
cussion of the uses of judicial power is that judges have overstepped their
proper bounds in limiting the efforts of nineteenth century legislatures to regu-
late the conduct of business. 3 He expresses the view that our constitutions
were not mindful enough of the general welfare and did not show enough
confidence in the uses of authority.4 The bar, he intimates, has catered too
much to the interests of business and, being too preoccupied with law as an
instrument for private gain, has not done enough for the common man. 5
All these criticisms have a solid foundation in fact and appear justified
from his twentieth-century viewpoint which sees in law a device for the ra-
tional ordering and harmonious adjustment of social relations. If, on the
other hand, we attempt to measure eighteenth and nineteenth century legal
developments by the then prevailing standards of value, we would find that law
in that epoch was regarded primarily as a bulwark of individual rights and
freedoms against governmental encroachments, and only secondarily as an
instrument of public power designed to promote the general welfare. Its chief
objective was to secure a maximum of individual self-assertion in the competi-
tive struggle for wealth, tempered by the indispensable minimum of regulation
necessary to preserve public order. On the basis of this outlook, a number
of factors and trends viewed by Professor Hurst with a critical eye may
be viewed as necessary concomitants of the prevailing social climate. If
1. P. 23.
2. P. 63.
3. P. 31.
4. P. 24.
5. Pp. 328, 375.
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private and corporate expansion of power (within certain limits) is valued
as the chief spur to economic progress, the susceptibility of legislators
to outside pressures is not necessarily undesirable. The inclination of
judges to view regulatory legislation in the social and economic field with
distrust is logical and meaningful in a social order which operates within the
framework of constitutions inspired by individualistic ideals rather than by
conceptions of "general welfare." The close association with business inter-
ests will not evoke pangs of bad conscience among lawyers when business is
regarded as the chief source for the creation of wealth, employment, and
prosperity. American history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
presents such a unique attempt to put a logically thought-out and self-con-
sistent pattern of life into operation that correlating legal developments with
political, ideological, and economic trends is, within the limits discussed below,
a particularly fruitful avenue of approach. Professor Hurst has done a pio-
neering job in this mode of historical presentation, although those who, like
this reviewer, have a personal predilection for maximum detachment in his-
torical writing, might argue that at some places in the book the author has
projected his own social ideals somewhat too strongly into an analysis of his-
torical materials which, as Tocqueville has shown, lend themselves particularly
well to an interpretation by standards of value intrinsic to the epoch.
One phase of the development that might have merited special considera-
tion in a study of this type is the peculiar relationship that binds the legal
profession to the object entrusted to its care, the law. A legal system de-
signed to set the "rules of the game" in a free society of competing individuals,
and to make these rules as certain as possible in order to ensure a reasonable
measure of calculability in economic transactions, tends to evolve, in the
hands of a professional class, into a highly technical mechanism following
autonomous lines of growth. In the attempt to shape the law into a logical
and self-consistent system, certain forms and conceptual aids are created
which, although born of expediency and practical necessity, in a later stage
are absolutized by the legal profession and elevated into allegedly "natural"
and essential elements of the law as such. Thus, many lawyers and judges,
after the introduction of code pleading, proclaimed the ancient forms of
action to be necessary forms of legal thinking which no code could abolish;
and the system of actional formalism, although progressively relaxed, con-
tinued to linger on in the Anglo-American legal system until our own
day. The doctrine of consideration has been watered down to what amounts
in most cases to a mere form requirement, yet in spite of its essentially
ritualistic character the doctrine remains deeply embedded in Anglo-Ameri-
can legal thinking. Similar attempts to petrify forms and conceptual de-
vices into ends in themselves can be observed in the history of legal science
in Rome. They are tied in with the general conservative leanings of the
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legal profession rightly attributed by Professor Hurst to the search for regu-
larity and predictability of affairs ;6 but one particular by-product of this mode
of thinking which deserves special emphasis is a certain emancipation of the
law from the social forces that helped to create it. The law gains some inde-
pendence from its socio-economic substructure and acquires a life and history
of its own. The positivistic approach to jurisprudence, which considers the law
as an independent and self-sufficient object of study to be kept "pure" from
the "contaminating" influence of the social sciences, has its historical roots in
such a condition of the law, i.e. a condition in which a partial divorce of the
law from its supporting sociological forces has in fact taken place. It should
be noted, however, that this phenomenon is limited to highly developed legal
systems whose administration is entrusted to a specially trained professional
class; and it is for this reason that its description and explanation would
seem to have a place in a history of the "law-makers."
The obvious dangers of such an insulation of the law are over-technicali-
zation and the growth of an interpretative formalism which converts the law
into a secret science comprehensible only to the initiated. A further practical
result is that the cost of administering the elaborate and complex apparatus of
the law becomes so great that litigation tends to become a privilege of the
upper classes. Countervailing propaganda for a popularization and simplifica-
tion of the administration of justice is inevitable and, if successful, is likely
to usher in an era of bureaucratization of the law which deprives the profes-
sional class of private practioners of a large share of its former influence in
society. In Rome, this development led to a gradual extinction of the class
of eminent private jurisconsults and the increasing absorption of lawyers into
the political and administrative hierarchy of the Empire. Outstanding lawyers
who in the period of the Republic would have chosen the career of a private
counsellor streamed into the-eublic service to become members of the Em-
peror's legal council or to serve as high judges or provincial administrators.
The result was an increasing integration of the law into the political apparatus
of the Empire; law ceased to enjoy an autonomous growth and became a flex-'
ible instrument used by the sovereign power to accomplish its political and
economic objectives. The story is highly instructive, and it unfolded under
political and international conditions not dissimilar to those facing us today.
We should ponder its causes and effects, for a crisis in the relationship of the
legal profession to society in general is in progress at the historical juncture at
which we stand. Professor Hurst's valuable work is a witness to its existence.
EDGAR BODENEEIMERt
6. P. 359.
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